because it can’t account for certain moral and political obligations that we commonly recognize and even prize.这包括 成员资格的义务、忠诚、团结，And these include obligations of membership, loyalty, solidarity,以及其它 不必经过我们同意 道德要求and other moral ties that may claim us for reasons that we can’t trace to an act of consent.Alasdair MacIntyre 提出了一种 他称之为 叙事式自我的观点Alasdair MacIntyre gives an account what he calls a narrative conception of the self.这是一种 不同的自我概念It’s a different account of the self.MacIntyre认为，人类本质上是一种 讲故事的生物Human beings are essentially storytelling creatures, MacIntyre argues.这就意味着，要回答“我该做什么” 这个问题That means I can only answer the question 'what am I to do?'必须先回答一个问题，“我的哪个故事里的一部分”if I can answer the prior question of what story or stories do I find myself a part?这就是他所说的“叙事式自我” 的意思That’s what he means by the narrative conception of the self.这和 社群以及归属 有什么关系呢？What does this have to do with the idea of community and belonging?MacIntyre说到MacIntyre says this,一旦你接受了 道德反思中 叙事性的一面Once you accept this narrative aspect of moral reflection你就会注意到，我们绝不会仅仅作为个人you will notice that we can never seek for the good来追求美好 或做道德的事。or exercise of the virtues only as individuals.我们是带着 我们身处的情景 所赋予我们的社会身份标识。We all approach our circumstance as bearers of particular social identities.我是某个人的儿子或女儿I am someone’s son or daughter,是这个 或者那个城市的居民a citizen of this or that city,我属于这个宗族，那个部族，这个民族I belonged to this clan, that tribe, this nation.因此，MacIntyre尔认为， 那些对我而言 是好的事物Hence, MacIntyre argues, what is good for me是针对 这个角色背景下 是好的。has to be the good for someone who inhabits these roles.我 从我的家族、城市、部族、民族的过去， 继承下来I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation各种各样的债务、遗产、期望和责任a variety of debts, inheritances, expectations, and obligations.这些构成了我生活的前提，我的道德初始点These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.这在某种程度上，赋予 我的生活 以道德独特性This is in part what gives my life its moral particularity.这就是叙事式的自我观That’s the narrative conception of the self.这一观点 将自我视为And it’s a conception that sees the self as至少在某种程度上 受制于claimed or encumbered, at least to some extent,我们身处的历史、传统、社群by the history, the tradition, the communities, of which it’s a part.如果不管 这些情景所赋予我们的特征，我们就不知道 我们生活的意义，不论是从心理上的，还是从道德上的。We can’t make sense of our lives, not only as a psychological matter, but also as a moral matter in thinking what we are to do without attending to these features about us.MacIntyre认识到，这种叙事式的看法，Now, MacIntyre recognizes that this narrative account,这种 受限制的自我this picture of the encumbered self,使得他的理论，与现今的 自由主义和个人主义 不协调puts his account at odds with contemporary liberalism and individualism.从个人主义的观点来看From the standpoint of individualism我是 我自己选择成为的 那个人I am what I myself choose to be.在生理上，我可能是我父亲的儿子I may biologically be my father’s son但是我不一定要 为他所做的事情负责but I can’t be held responsible for what he did除非我选择承担 那样的责任unless I choose to assume such responsibility.我也不一定要 为我的国家做的 或者做过的事情负责I can’t be held responsible for what my country does, or has done,除非我选择承担 那样的责任unless I choose to assume such responsibility.但是MacIntyre认为，这反映出 某种道德上的肤浅But MacIntyre says this reflects a certain kind of moral shallowness甚至是盲目even blindness.这是一种 与高度的责任感不相符 的盲目It’s a blindness at odds with the full measure of responsibility which sometimes,他说，这种责任感涉及到 集体责任，he says, involves collective responsibility or或者从过去的历史中 流传下来的责任responsibilities that may flow from historic memories.他还给出了一些例子And he gives some examples.那样的个人主义被 某些当代的美国人表现了出来Such individualism is expressed by those contemporary Americans这种人 拒绝承担 奴隶制给黑人带来的影响，who deny any responsibility for the effects of slavery upon black Americans saying他们说 "我又没有拥有过奴隶""I never owned any slaves."又比如，一些1945年以后出生的 年轻的德国人 认为Or the young German who believes that having been born after 1945 means纳粹对犹太人的恶行， 同他们和当代犹太人之间，没有任何道德上的关联that what Nazis did to Jews has no moral relevance to his relationship to his Jewish contemporaries.MacIntyre认为，这种对历史健忘的态度MacIntyre says all of these attitudes of historical amnesia相当于是 一种道德缺席amount to a kind of moral abdication.一旦你认识到 我们是谁Once you see that who we are从中了解到 我们的义务and what it means to sort out our obligations这些义务 不能,也不应当从 赋予了我们意义 的生活历史中 分离出来。can’t be separated, shouldn’t be separated from the life histories that define us.他说，叙事式的观点 与（个人主义）的对比 是明显的The contrast, he says, with a narrative account, is clear,我的生活故事 总是镶嵌在 我所在的社群的故事里，For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities这个社群 赋予了我的身份标识from which I derived my identity.我 带着过去的历史 而生的。试图 斩断与过去的联系I am born with the past and to try to cut myself off from that past就会使 我现在关系 变形。is to deform my present relationships.这就是 MacIntyre 的 一种有力的观点：So there you have in MacIntyre, a strong statement of the idea认为 自我是 不能也不应当that the self can’t be detached, shouldn’t be detached,从 它与社群关系、历史、叙事的特定纽带中， 分离开来from its particular ties of membership, history, story narrative.现在，我听听你们怎么看 社群主义者们Now, I want to get your reactions to the communitarian critique对 个人主义、唯意志主义者、无拘无束的自我观 的批评。of the individualist or the voluntarist, the unencumbered self.不过，为了让你们 不只是对这些理论的回应，But let’s make it concrete so that you can react to more than just the theory of it我们先看看 道德和政治义务的 两种不同的产生方式，by looking at the two different accounts of moral and political obligation that arise而这两种看法 取决于 你接受哪种depending on which of these conceptions of the person one accepts.在自由主义者来看On the liberal conception,道德和政治义务可以 经由两种方式产生moral and political obligations arise in one of two ways.有一些自然义务，是作为人类本身 所负有的。There are natural duties that we owe human beings as such.将人视为人 加以尊重的义务duties of respect for persons qua persons.这种义务是普遍的These obligations are universal.此外，正如Rawls指出的Then, as Rawls points out,还有一些是自愿的义务there are also voluntary obligations.这些义务 是针对特定的人，经由我们同意 所承担的义务，Obligations that we owe to particular others insofar as we have agreed不论是通过承诺、交易或者合同whether through a promise or a deal or a contract.现在就涉及到，自由主义者和社群主义者，这两者的自我观。Now, the issue between the liberal and communitarian accounts of the self,是否还有另外一种义务？Is there another category of obligation or not?社群主义者认为 有。The communitarian says there is.存在第三种义务，它可以被称为There is a third category that might be called团结、忠诚 或者成员资格的义务obligations of solidarity or loyalty or membership.社群主义者认为，自由主义者对于义务的全部论述The communitarian argues that construing all obligations不论是自然义务，还是自愿义务as either natural duties or voluntary obligations都不能涵盖 维持成员资格、团结的义务fails to capture obligations of membership or solidarity.对于忠诚，其道德力量 部分在于Loyalties whose moral force consists partly in the fact忠诚 是理解我们是谁（我们归属哪个群体） 所不可或缺的。that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are.有什么例子呢？What would be some examples?然后我想听听，你们对此有何看法。And then I want to see how you would react to them.关于 由成员资格产生义务 的例子Examples of obligations of membership这种义务不一定经过 同意而产生that are particular but don’t necessarily flow from consent而是由于 你是社群的成员 而产生的but rather from membership, narrative, community, one situation.最常见的例子 就是和家庭有关的义务The most common examples are ones to do with the family.比如 父母和孩子之间的关系The relation between parents and children, for example.假设，有两个孩子掉到水里了Suppose there were two children drowning.而你只能救其中一个You could save only one of them.这两个孩子中，一个是你的，另一个是陌生人的One was your child, the other was a stranger’s child.你难道有义务，要通过抛硬币来 决定救谁？Would you have an obligation to flip a coin还是说，如果你没有冲上去救自己的孩子，那就是道德上的麻木迟钝呢？or would there be something morally obtuse if you didn’t rush to save your child?现在，你可能会说Now, you may say, well,是父母 自己同意有孩子的parents have agreed to have their children.再看看另外一种情况，看看子女对父母的义务So take the other case, the case of children’s obligation for their parents.我们没有 选择谁来做自己的父母Now, we don’t choose our parents.我们甚至不能选择 是否有父母We don’t even choose to have parents.这里存在 不对等的问题There is that asymmetry.如果有 两位年迈的父母，一个是你的，And yet consider two aging parents, one of them yours,一个是陌生人的the other a stranger’s.如果你觉得，你更有义务照顾自己的父母，而非 那位陌生人的父母这在道德上是不是 更说得过去？Doesn’t it make moral sense to think that you have a greater obligation to look after your aged parent than to flip a coin or to help the stranger’s?这涉及到 同意了吗？ 明显没有。Now, is this traceable to consent? Not likely或者举几个政治上的例子Or take a couple of political examples.在二战期间， 法国抵抗力量的飞行员During World War II, French resistance pilots奉命轰炸被占领的法国领土flew bombing raids over occupied France.一天，一个飞行员接到 自己的轰炸目标One day, one of the pilots received his target他发现要轰炸的村庄and noticed that the village he was being asked to bomb正是他以前的家乡was his home village.他拒绝了这一任务，其理由不是因为 这个轰炸目标不像昨天的目标那么有必要。He refused, not disputing that it was as necessary as the target he bombed yesterday.而是因为 他下不了决心He refused on the ground that he couldn’t bring himself.对他来说，向自己人丢下炸弹 是一种道德罪行It would be a special moral crime for him to bomb his people尽管这样做是 为了解放法国---他所支持的这项运动。even in a cause that he supported, the cause of liberating France.那么，我们敬佩他吗？Now, do we admire that?如果我们赞同他的做法，社群主义者们会说，If we do, the communitarian argues,那是因为我们的确承认 维持团结的义务。it’s because we do recognize obligations of solidarity.再举一个例子Take another example.很多年前，在埃塞俄比亚 爆发了饥荒Some years ago there was a famine in Ethiopia.成千上万的人 面临饥饿的威胁Hundreds of thousands of people were starving.以色列政府 组织空运物资，救助埃塞俄比亚籍 的那些犹太人The Israeli government organized an airlift to rescue Ethiopian Jews.他们没有能力 去救埃塞俄比亚的 所有人They didn’t have the capacity to rescue everyone in Ethiopia.他们就只救助了几百个 埃籍犹太人They rescued several hundred Ethiopian Jews.你们对此在道德上作何评价？Now, what’s your moral assessment?那是不是一种 道德上的偏心，或者说是 一种偏见？Is that a kind of morally troubling partiality, a kind of prejudice?或者像 以色列政府所认为的，这次空运应当承担维护团结的特别义务？Or as the Israeli government thought, is there a special obligation of solidarity that this airlift properly responded to?这样，我们就进入了一个更为宽泛的问题---爱国主义Well, that takes us to the broader question of patriotism.