历史上种族隔离，其动机是恶意的can be based on malice being the motivation for the historical segregation act,因为当时他们说，我们不要让 黑人或犹太人 进来so it's saying that we're not going to let blacks or Jews in因为他们 作为个人或组织都很糟because they're worse as people or as a group.好的。所以，（我们的案件里）不存在恶意的因素Good, so the element of malice isn't present.你的名字？——Stevie.And what's your name?- Stevie.Stevie认为，历史上的种族主义隔离政策，Stevie says that in the historic segregationas racist,反犹限额或是禁令anti-Semitic quotas or prohibitions.这些做法的背后藏着 某种恶意、某种恶意的判断There was built into them, a certain kind of malice, a certain kind of judgment认为 非裔美国人或是犹太人的价值 低于其他人that African Americans or Jews were somehow less worthy than everybody else.而如今的“平权运动” 措施Whereas present dayaffirmative action programs并没有 牵扯或暗示 任何这类判断don't involve or imply any such judgment.这就相当于说，这个政策What it amounts to saying is, so long as the policy,只是利用人们的价值，去实现这所机构的社会目标，just uses people in a way as valuable to the social purpose of the institution,只要它不是 在恶意地判断申请者，认为他们本质上更没价值。it's okay provided it doesn't judge them, maliciously, as Stevie might add, as intrinsically less worthy.我想 提一个问题I'd like to raise a question.这不就是容许，Doesn't that concede that当我们为了竞争学校的一个职位或名额时，all of us when we compete for positions or for seats in colleges and universities（学校）可以利用我们，而非判断我们，in a way are being used, not judged, but used,而这种利用我们的方式，与道义应得无关。in a way that has nothing to do with moral desert.记得我们 对"平权行动”的整个讨论，Remember we got into this whole discussion of affirmative action当时我们试图搞清楚when we were trying to figure out分配正义 与道义应得 是否有关whether distributive justice shouldbe tied to moral desert or not.我们一开始提出了 Rawls的问题，以及他否认和And we were launched on that question by Rawls and his denial, his rejection of the idea that反对 把分配正义 基于 个人所处的阶级、收入或财富地位distributive justice whether its positions or places in the class or income and wealth这是关于 道义应得的问题。It's a matter of moral desert.假定 那就是哈佛录取政策 的道义基础Suppose that were the moral basis of Harvard's admissions policy,他们在给 被拒者或录取者 写信是会怎么写？what letters would they have to write to people they rejected or accepted for that matter?他们会不会这样写：Wouldn't they have to write something like this:“亲爱的不成功的申请者"Dear unsuccessful applicant,我们很遗憾的通知你，你的入学申请we regret to inform you that your application for admission被拒绝了has been rejected.这不是你的错，因为 当你来到这个社会上时，It's not your fault that when you came along society刚好不需要 你具备的那些品质.happened not to need the qualities you had to offer.那些取代你、拿到录取的人，不是他们本身 配拿到这个名额，Those admitted instead of you are not themselves deserving of a place也不是因为 他们具备了我们所欣赏的品质。nor worthy of a praise for the factors that led their admission.我们只是利用你和他们，作为实现 更远大的社会目标的 一种手段We are in any case only using them and you as instruments of a wider social purpose.祝你下次好运”Better luck next time."如果你被录取后，又会收到一封什么信呢？What was the letter you actually got when you were admitted?这封信可能会这样写道Perhaps it should have read something like this:“亲爱的成功申请人"Dear successful applicant,我们很荣幸通知您，我们接受了您的申请。we are pleased to inform you that yourapplication for admission has been accepted.你真幸运It turns out, lucky for you,你拥有 现在这个社会 所需要的品质that you have the traits that society needs at the moment,因此，我们打算 利用你的资本，来造福社会。so we propose to exploit your assets for society's advantage.祝贺你You are to be congratulated.你能拿到录取，不是归功于 你拥有的某些品质，Not in the sense that you deserve credit for having the qualities that led to your admission,这只不过像 六合彩赢家那样，值得让人祝贺而已。but only in a sense that the winner of a lottery is to be congratulated.如果你选择 接受我们的录取And if you choose to accept our offer,你最终将有资格，被（我们）以这种方式来利用，并得到其中附带的好处。you will ultimately be entitled to the benefits that attach to being used in this way.期望在秋季 见到你”We look forward to seeing you in the fall."现在，它有点奇怪Now, there is something a little odd,道德上的奇怪morally odd,如果这些信，真的反映出if it's true that those letters do reflect政策背后的 这种理论和哲学理念the theory,the philosophy underlying the policy.这就是他们提出的问题So here's the question they pose.这个问题 把我们带到一个 政治哲学的大问题上来：And it's a question that takes us back to a big issue in political philosophy.是否可能，或是否值得Is it possible,and is it desirable,把分配正义的问题，从道义应得问题和美德问题中，脱离出来？to detach questions of distributive justice from questions of moral desert and questions of virtue?在许多方面In many ways,这是现代政治哲学，与古老的政治思想 的区分点this is an issue that separates modern political philosophy from ancient political thought.我们是否可以把道义应得 放在一边----这个问题的关键之处是什么？What's at stake in the question of whether we can put desert, moral desert aside?在我们阅读Rawls的著作时It seemed when we were reading Rawls,他把分配正义 从道义应得中脱离出来，其动机和理由that the incentive, the reason he had, for detaching distributive justice from moral desert是为了实现 平等。was an egalitarian one.如果我们把 道德应得 放在一边That if we set desert to one side,就会有更多 实现平等的机会there's greater scope for the exercise of egalitarian considerations.“无知的面纱”The veil of ignorance.那两个原则，那个“差别原则” （第8集提到）The two principles, the difference principle,帮助最不富裕的人，重新分配，以及其他。helping the least well off, redistribution and all that.不过，有趣之处在于，如果你回想But what's interesting, is if you look,我们讨论过的一系列思想家at a range of thinkers we've been considering,他们似乎都想把 分配正义从道德应得中 脱离出来there does seem to be a reason they want to detach justice from desert这样就可以避过 对平等问题的所有顾虑。that goes well beyond any concern for equality.我们已经讨论过的，自由主义 权利取向的理论家们Libertarian rights oriented theorists, the kind we've been studying,以及 包括Rawls在内的 权利平等取向的理论家们，as well as egalitarian rights oriented theorists, including Rawls,在这一点上，也包括康德and for that matter, also including Kant,他们都同意这一点。 尽管他们在分配正义all agree, despite their disagreements over distributive justice,福利国家，以及其他方面 见解不一、and the welfare state and all of that,但他们都认为，分配正义 并不是关于 奖赏美德的问题they all agree that justice is not a matter of rewarding or honoring virtue或是 道义应得or moral desert.他们为什么都会这样认为？Now why do they all think that?这并非仅仅出于 平等主义理由It can't just be for egalitarian reasons他们并不都是平等主义者not all of them are egalitarians.这就把我们引向一个，我们一直想厘清的哲学大问题This gets us to the big philosophical question we have to try to sort out.不知何故，他们都认为，如果把正义与 道义应得或美德 连在一起Somehow they think tying justice to moral merit or virtue就会让我们 远离自由is going to lead away from freedom,远离 对作为自由存在的个体 的尊重from respect for persons as free beings.好的，为了弄明白，他们这样看重的是什么Well, in order to see what they consider to be at stake,并且为了评估 他们所共同的假设and in order to assess their shared assumption,我们必须求助于 一位思想家，一位哲学家we need to turn to a thinker, to a philosopher,他不同意 以上众人的见解who disagrees with them.他明确的 将正义与 荣誉、美德、功德Who explicitly ties justice to honor, honoring virtue,和道义应得 联系在一起and merit and moral desert.这位思想家是 亚里士多德And that thinker is Aristotle.在很多方面，亚里士多德 关于正义的思想Now, in many ways Aristotle's idea of justice都看起来很有 说服力is intuitively very powerful.但在某些方面，它也很奇怪In some ways it's strange.我要把这两方面--貌似有理而又奇怪-- 都作介绍I want to bring out both its power, its plausibility and its strangeness,这样我们就可以明白，整个关于正义的辩论中，什么是关键的so that we can see what's at stake in this whole debate about justice以及 它是否与 道义应得和美德 有关and whether it's tied to desert and virtue.那么，亚里士多德对于 正义问题的回答是什么呢？So, what is Aristotle's answer to the question about justice?对亚里士多德来说，正义是给予人们应得的东西For Aristotle, justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve,是给予人们 本来属于他们的东西giving people their due.正义 就是帮助人们，根据他们的美德，找到合适的社会角色 的问题It's a matter of figuring out the proper fit between persons, with their virtues, and their appropriate social roles.这样一幅正义的图景 看起来会是怎样的Well, what does this picture of justice look like,它与 自由主义和平等主义取向 的思想家们，所共有的理念，又有什么区别？and how does it differ from the conception that seems to be sharedamong libertarian and egalitarian rights oriented theorists alike?正义意味着 给予每个人--他或她应有的，Justice means giving each person his or her due,就是 给予人们应得之物giving people what they deserve.但一个人应得的是什么？But what is a person's due?它与 道义应得和美德 的相关之处 是什么？What are the relevant grounds of merit or desert?亚里士多德认为，这要看 被分配的是何种事物Aristotle says that depends on the sort of things being distributed.“正义与两个因素有关： 什么物品，"Justice involves two factors: Things以及 分配给谁and the persons to whom the things are assigned.亚里士多德写道，“一般而言，In general we say," Aristotle writes,同等的人 就应当有同等的事物 分配予他们”"That persons who are equal should have equal things assigned to them."但在分配中出现了 一个困难的问题But here there arises a hard question.在哪些方面 同等？Equals in what respects?亚里士多德认为，这要看 我们分配的是什么东西Aristotle says that depends on the sort of thing we're distributing.假定，我们分配的是长笛Suppose we're distributing flutes.对于长笛来说，它相应的 道义应得的基础 是什么？What is the relevant merit or basis of desert for flutes?谁该得到 最好的那只长笛？Who should get the best ones?亚里士多德的回答是什么？What's Aristotle's answer?有谁知道？Anyone?正确的回答是 最好的长笛手The best flute players, right.那些 在这方面最优秀的，Those who are best in the relevant sense,最好的长笛手the best flute players.在长笛的分配中，这种差别对待是否 是正义的？ 是的Is it just to discriminate in allocating flutes? Yes.所有正义 都牵扯到差别对待，亚里士多德这样说。All justice involves discrimination, Aristotle says.关键的是，这种差别对待，要根据有关的优点，What matters is that the discrimination be according to the relevant excellence,看看 拥有长笛 需要具备哪些特质。according to the virtue appropriate to having flutes.他认为，如果是按照其他方式 来进行分配，则是非正义的He says it would be unjust to discriminate on some other basis.比如说，把最好的长笛 分给 有钱的人