"By all means," said he."And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy?""Necessarily," said he."For," said Socrates, "if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd. ""How so, Socrates?""You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the great evils?""They certainly do. ""And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils?""That is true. ""Then all expect philosophers are brave through fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice. ""Very true. ""And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, neverthe- less their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of self-indulgence. ""So it seems. ""My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in fact a purification from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, ' the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few' ; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God's will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here, because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well. "When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said;"Socrates, I agree to the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now, there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no litde argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence. ""What you say, Cebes, is true," said Socrates. "Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?""I do," said Cebes. "I should like to hear what you think about it. ""Well," said Socrates, "I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end."Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed. ""Certainly," said Cebes."Now," said he, "if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are coundess other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater. ""Yes. ""And if it becomes smaller, it must have been greater and then have become smaller?""That is true," said he."And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker?""Certainly. ""And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?"" Of course. ""Then," said he , "we have this fact sufEciendy established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?""Certainly. ""Now then, is there between all these pairs of opposites what may be called two kinds of generation, from one to the other and back again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other decreasing, do we not?""Yes," said he."And similarly analysing and combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other?""Certainly," said he."Well then," said Socrates, "is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the opposite of sleeping?""Certainly," said Cebes."What?""Being dead," said he."Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?"" Of course. ""Now," said Socrates, "I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake, and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?""Certainly. ""Now do you," said he, "tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?""I do. ""And that they are generated one from the other?""Yes. ""Now what is it which is generated from the living?""The dead," said he."And what," said Socrates, "from the dead?""I can say only one thing—the living. ""From the dead, then, Cebes, the living, both things and persons, are generated?""Evidendy," said he."Then," said Socrates, "our souls exist in the other world. ""So it seems. ""And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?""Certainly," said he."Well then," said Socrates, "what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?""Certainly we must," said he."What is this process?"" Coming to life again. ""Then," said Socrates, "if there be such a thing as coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?""Certainly. ""So by this method also we reach the conclusion that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life. ""I think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions. ""Now here is mother method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions. For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all. ""What do you mean?" said he."It is not at all hard," said Socrates, "to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, ' all things are chaos,' would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?""I see none, Socrates," said Cebes. "What you say seems to be perfecdy true. ""I think, Cebes," said he, "it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist. ""And besides," Cebes rejoined, "if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being bom in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal. ""But, Cebes," said Simmias, "what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now. ""Briefly," said Cebes, "a very good proof is this:When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort. ""And if you are not convinced in that way, Simmias. " said Socrates, " see if you don't agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?""I am not incredulous," said Simmias, "but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say. ""It was this," said he. "We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?""Certainly," said he."Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?""What do you mean?"" Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre. ""Of course. ""Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite coundess such examples. ""To be sure you could," said Simmias."Now," said he, "is that sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?""Certainly," he replied."Well, then," said Socrates, "can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?""Surely. ""And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?""Yes," said he."All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?""Yes. ""And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?""Inevitably," he replied."Now see," said he, "if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?""We shall say that there is," said Simmias, "most decidedly. ""And do we know what it is?""Certainly," said he."Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?""Certainly. ""Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?""No, Socrates, never. ""Then," said he, "those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract. ""Not at all, I should say, Socrates. ""But from those equals," said he, "which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?""Very true," he replied."And it is either like them or unlike them?""Certainly. ""It makes no difference," said he. "Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection. ""Surely. ""Now then," said he, "do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way:Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?""They fall very far short of it," said he."Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, ' This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,' he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?""We must. ""Well, then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?""It certainly is. ""Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, ' All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short. ' ""That is true. ""And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike. ""Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument. ""Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?""Yes. ""Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it. ""That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates. ""And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?""Certainly. ""But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?""Yes. ""Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were bom. ""It does. ""Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were bom, and were bom with it, we knew before we were bom and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of ' absolute' in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth. ""That is true. ""And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?""Certainly, Socrates," said he."But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were bom and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?""Assuredly. ""For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be recollection. ""That is certainly true, Socrates. ""Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?""I cannot choose at this moment, Socrates. ""How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it:When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?""Certainly he can, Socrates. ""And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking?""I wish they might," said Simmias; "but on the contrary I fear that tomorrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly. ""Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these things?""By no means. ""Then they recollect the things they once learned?""Necessarily. ""When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings. "" Certainly not. ""Then previously. ""Yes. ""Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence. ""Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time still remains. ""Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?""None whatever, Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense. ""Then, Simmias," said he, "is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were bom, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?"" Socrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that our soul existed before we were bom, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists. For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most red existence. And I think the proof is sufficient. ""But how about Cebes?" said Socrates. "For Cebes must be convinced, too. ""He is fully convinced, I think. " said Simmias; "and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were bom. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?""You are right, Simmias," said Cebes. "It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth. But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect. ""It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already," said Socrates, " if you will combine this conclusion with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and, when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be bom again? So the proof you call for has already been given. However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather. "And Cebes laughed and said, "Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin. "" Ah," said Socrates, "you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear. ""Where then, Socrates," said he, "shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?"" Hellas, Cebes," he replied, " is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for perhaps you would hardly find others better able to do this than you. ""That," said Cebes, "shall be done. But let us return to the point where we left off, if you are willing. ""Oh, I am willing, of course. ""Good," said he."Well then," said Socrates, "must we not ask ourselves some such question as this? What kind of thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind of thing might we naturally fear it, and again what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after this must we not inquire to which class the soul belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon the answers to these questions?""You are quite right," he replied."Now is not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded? And if anything is uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?""I think," said Cebes, "that is true. ""Then it is most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things?""Yes, I think so. ""Let us then," said he, "turn to what we were discussing before. Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being—do they ever admit of any change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence, since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?""It must," said Cebes, "necessarily remain the same, Socrates. ""But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constandy changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?""The latter," said Cebes; "they are never the same. ""And you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?""Certainly," said he, "that is true. ""Now," said he, "shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?""Let us assume them," said cebes."And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constandy changing?""Let us assume that also," said he."Well then," said Socrates, "are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?""Yes," he replied."Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?""To the visible," said he; "that is clear to everyone. ""And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?""Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates. ""But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?""Yes, we do. ""Then what do we say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?""It cannot be seen. ""Then it is invisible?""Yes. ""Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is, and the body more like the visible. ""Necessarily, Socrates. ""Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses, —then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?""Certainly. ""But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?"